Who Has the Basis for Morality? Part 4: Conclusion

This is the conclusion of the series.

Stephen Maitzen, in his paper, makes an emotionally compelling argument against philosophical arguments that are meant to excuse the apparent inaction of God from a position which is philosophically afraid to address a present reality: man as a fallen creature. This failure to engage from a position of revelation has provided an unbeliever with grounds to attack a straw man. Any philosophical position, that does not begin with the presupposition of the truth of Scripture in moral matters, leaves itself open to attack. 

Maitzen regularly assumes obligations and moral qualifications that his atheism cannot account for through the use of emotion driven arguments. He demonstrates great sympathy for his examples, as well as empathy in making his appeals; however, in attempting to prove his position, or even that there should be some kind of justification for such, he demonstrates that he must borrow moral capital to create categories and adjudicate responses. His assumptions actually serve to demonstrate an inconsistency between his atheism and his apparent outrage. 

In response to Maitzen, it has been shown in this paper, albeit briefly, that only in the assumption of the truth of Christian theism grounded in the revelation found in Scripture can one make meaningful distinctions between moral categories, but also ground any basis for response in a coherent manner. It is not that such as what has been presented here is exhaustive, but rather to summarize basic concepts that are needed to assume the moral reasoning necessary to make sense of the fact that Maitzen’s objections do not flow from atheism. 

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